Philosophy of Science

Karl Popper's criterion that for a theory to be considered scientific, it must make predictions that could, in principle, be shown to be false by observation or experiment. Falsifiability distinguishes science from pseudoscience, not by proving theories true, but by requiring that they be testable and potentially refutable.

Thomas Kuhn's concept describing a fundamental change in the basic assumptions, methods, and accepted results within a scientific discipline. During a paradigm shift, the dominant framework (paradigm) is replaced by a new one that better accounts for anomalies the old paradigm could not explain.

The philosophical challenge of defining clear criteria that distinguish science from non-science and pseudoscience. Various proposals have been offered, including verifiability (logical positivists), falsifiability (Popper), and puzzle-solving within paradigms (Kuhn), but no single criterion has gained universal acceptance.

The philosophical position that successful scientific theories describe the world approximately as it really is, and that the entities they posit (such as electrons, genes, and quarks) genuinely exist, even when they cannot be directly observed. Realists argue that the success of science would be miraculous if theories did not at least approximately correspond to reality.

Induction is the reasoning process of drawing general conclusions from specific observations. The problem of induction, identified by David Hume, is that no finite number of observations can logically guarantee a universal conclusion. We cannot prove that the future will resemble the past, yet science relies heavily on inductive reasoning.

The thesis that the available empirical evidence is always compatible with more than one theory. Since multiple theories can account for the same observations, evidence alone cannot conclusively determine which theory is correct, raising questions about how scientists choose among competing theories.

A philosophical movement originating with the Vienna Circle in the 1920s-1930s that held that meaningful statements are either analytically true (true by definition) or empirically verifiable through observation. Statements that are neither were considered meaningless, which effectively excluded much of metaphysics and theology from meaningful discourse.

The idea, advanced by philosophers including N.R. Hanson and Thomas Kuhn, that all observation is influenced by the observer's prior theoretical commitments, expectations, and conceptual frameworks. There is no purely neutral observation; what scientists see is shaped by what they already believe.

A form of reasoning in which one selects the hypothesis that, if true, would provide the best explanation for the observed evidence. Unlike deduction, it does not guarantee truth, but it is widely used in science to choose among competing hypotheses based on criteria like simplicity, scope, and explanatory power.

Thomas Kuhn's distinction between two phases of scientific activity. Normal science is the routine work of puzzle-solving within an accepted paradigm, extending and applying the paradigm's methods. Revolutionary science occurs when accumulated anomalies provoke a crisis, leading to the rejection of the old paradigm and adoption of a new one.