Philosophy of Mind Glossary

The aspect of consciousness whereby mental content is available for use in reasoning, reporting, and the rational control of behavior, as distinguished from phenomenal consciousness.

The view that mental concepts refer to behavioral dispositions rather than inner states. To be in pain is to be disposed to wince, cry out, and seek relief.

The principle that every physical event has a sufficient physical cause. If true, it challenges the idea that non-physical mental states can cause physical events.

The view that the mind operates like a computer, manipulating symbols according to rules. Thinking is a form of computation over mental representations.

The state of being aware of and able to think about one's own existence, thoughts, and surroundings. In philosophy, it refers especially to subjective experience -- 'what it is like' to be in a mental state.

Any view holding that mind and body (or mental and physical) are fundamentally distinct. Substance dualism posits two kinds of substance; property dualism posits two kinds of property within one substance.

The position that common-sense psychological concepts (beliefs, desires) are part of a false folk theory and will be eliminated by neuroscience.

The view that consciousness and other mental properties emerge from complex physical systems but are not reducible to or predictable from the properties of their parts.

The view that mental events are caused by physical events but have no causal power over the physical. Consciousness is a by-product of brain activity.

Joseph Levine's term for the gap between physical/functional descriptions of the brain and subjective experience. Even if physicalism is true, we lack an account of why brain states feel the way they do.

The common-sense framework that explains and predicts behavior in terms of beliefs, desires, intentions, and other mental states.

The theory that mental states are defined by their functional roles rather than by their physical makeup. A mental state is whatever plays the right causal role.

The view that mental states are identical to brain states. Each type of mental state corresponds to a specific type of neural state.

The property of mental states by which they are directed at, about, or represent objects, states of affairs, or propositions.

Frank Jackson's argument that complete physical knowledge does not include knowledge of what subjective experience is like, as illustrated by the Mary's Room thought experiment.

The capacity of mental states to cause physical events. The problem of mental causation asks how thoughts and intentions can cause bodily movements.

An internal cognitive symbol or state that stands for or represents something in the external world. Beliefs, concepts, and percepts are forms of mental representation.

The thesis that a given mental state can be physically implemented in many different substrates (biological neurons, silicon chips, etc.).

The view that mentality or experiential properties are fundamental and ubiquitous features of the natural world, present even in basic physical entities.

The aspect of consciousness that involves subjective experience -- the 'what it is like' quality of a mental state.

The thesis that everything that exists is physical, or supervenes on the physical. All mental phenomena are ultimately explicable in physical terms.

The subjective, qualitative properties of conscious experience, such as the redness of red or the painfulness of pain.

A dependence relation: mental properties supervene on physical properties if no mental difference can occur without a corresponding physical difference.

The problem of explaining why and how physical processes in the brain give rise to subjective experience, as distinct from explaining cognitive functions.

Hypothetical beings physically identical to conscious humans but entirely lacking subjective experience. Used in arguments against physicalism.